

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL ESTIMATES BOARD

57

14 February 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: NIE-10: Communist China, published 17 January 1951

1. Pursuant to a review of subject estimate by the National Estimates Board, the following additions and revisions are submitted for the consideration of the IAC at its meeting at 2:30 Thursday, 15 February.

2. These changes have not previously been discussed with the IAC representatives.

3. Revisions in text:

Para. 14(c) - Delete word "conceivably" in next to last line

Para. 14(e) - Delete in entirety

4. Add as paragraphs 15 and 16:

"15. Each of the measures outlined in (a), (b), (c) and (d) above could be applied with varying degrees of intensity. If they were all applied simultaneously and at the highest level of intensity that the US or UN could mount and support, we believe that these measures would imperil the stability of the Chinese Communist regime."


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"16. Neither the Chinese Communist regime nor the Chinese people could be expected to remain passive after the initiation of such counter measures. These measures would undoubtedly be portrayed as proof of Kuomintang and US 'imperialism and aggression'. Those involving direct military action would be regarded as marking a transition from localized to general war on US initiative. General and open Chinese attack on all Western interests would therefore have to be expected. Not only would Chinese Communist ties with the USSR and Chinese Communist dependence on the USSR be strengthened, but the USSR would probably furnish increased economic aid and unofficial military aid. In that case the USSR would aim to get the US deeply involved in Asia, and at the same time exploit the fact of US involvement and Western fears of global war to play upon neutralist and defeatist sentiment in the Near East and Western Europe, and thereby divide the US from its allies. On the other hand if the USSR should intervene openly on the basis of the Sino-Soviet treaty, such action would probably be taken as part of the initiation of general war against the US."

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Executive SecretarySECRET